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Is Technology for the Anthropocene 
an Impossibility? A Conversation 
about the Myko Project
Mark Antaki1 and Richard Janda2
We, the two interlocutors in this discussion, Mark Antaki and Richard 
Janda, have for the past number of years had periodic exchanges about the 
theoretical underpinnings and possible critique of a project that Janda has 
been leading, which seeks to signal to individuals the impacts of their choices 
upon collective environmental, health and social goods and to orient these 
individuals to make better choices. Antaki has sought to probe a number of 
paradoxes and challenges for legal normativity involved in using new forms 
of technology to address the accumulating and devastating externalities 
produced by our use of technology. A mutual fascination with the project and 
its critique led us to conclude that the discussion might have some broader 
saliency. This dialogue allowed us to share our preoccupations concerning the 
pervasive quality of technology in our lives and to explore how our efforts to 
redress the dominion of technology over nature might cede to the temptation 
to call upon new forms of technology in aid. Is this temptation to be resisted?
M: Richard, your project has led to the development of an app for 
a cell phone. As I understand it, the app is supposed to help people 
become aware of their patterns of consumption, even their modes of 
life, and help them to become more responsible for their choices. Could 
you explain how the app grows out of your concerns about climate 
change and the Anthropocene, and in particular how a law professor 
got involved in such a project?
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R: I had an experience in 2009 that felt as if the scales had fallen 
off my eyes. It was at the failed Copenhagen Summit that sealed 
the fate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. As a jurist, I had come to imagine that a global treaty was the 
necessary pinnacle of achievement for the coordination of social norms 
to mitigate our impacts on the biosphere. The logic seemed compelling. 
Since each of us affects all of us in participating in an economy that 
generates unsustainable greenhouse gas emissions, only a collective 
framework governing all emissions could succeed in confronting the 
crisis. There had after all been a precedent. The Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer adopted in 1987 succeeded 
in curbing the use of these substances and in shrinking what came 
to be known as the ‘hole in the ozone layer’ (Strahan and Douglass 
2018).  But at Copenhagen in 2009, it became obvious that the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would 
not succeed despite the thousands of climate justice protesters and 
pious expressions of concern from world leaders. The atmosphere was 
grim from the very outset when the lead negotiator for the Obama 
administration, Todd Stern, stated, ‘I actually completely reject the 
notion of a debt or reparations or anything of the like. For most of 
the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, people were blissfully 
ignorant of the fact that emissions caused a greenhouse effect. It’s a 
relatively recent phenomenon’ (New York Times December 9 2012). This 
meant in practice that there would be no way to align the position of 
‘developing countries’ with that of the industrialised world toward a 
common emissions trading framework. Sure enough, the 2009 process 
collapsed and all that could ultimately be salvaged from it was the 
hollow Paris Agreement of 2015, which has itself now unravelled. 
For me, this was a dramatic failure of law. True, the politicians had 
allowed that legal instrument to whither and die. But the very idea of 
proceeding by way of a formal legal framework was itself left in tatters. 
What had been perhaps the most elaborate effort of all time to generate 
world-wide treaty-making capacity to address an existential challenge 
for the entire world’s population had led to a dead end. So, I had to ask 
myself if there was another way to generate the requisite transformation 
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of social norms. If the transformation of the social and economic norms 
could not be achieved through a formal agreement of states binding all 
from the top down, might it be achieved through informal means? You 
know well my pedigree of work with Rod Macdonald on legal pluralism 
and informal normativity (Janda, Jukier and Jutras 2015). I had already 
come to believe that there was too much faith being placed in a kind 
of legal formalism and abstract positivism. So, I began searching for 
ways in which legal norms could be fashioned collectively without the 
apparatus of state treaties.
The work of Elinor Ostrom also served as a fascinating invitation to 
imagine how to favour the stewardship of collective goods. Although 
her Nobel Prize was in economics, much of her work paid attention to 
modes of informal governance and social signalling in the management 
of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990). If the problem we are facing, 
the very destruction of the biosphere, is the most significant tragedy of 
the commons ever produced, then decentralised, polycentric solutions 
like those explored by Ostrom would have to be deployed on a global 
scale.
M: Hearing you speak confirms my sense that your project involves 
a set of fascinating encounters with normativity.  The research seems 
to come out of a sense of urgency in the face of a predicament that 
affects all humans. I cannot help but think of Hannah Arendt’s idea 
of a ‘negative solidarity’ of humanity forged by technology and tied to 
humanity’s capacity to destroy itself. In some sense, you wish to bring 
‘political responsibility’ (Arendt 1968: 83) to this negative solidarity.
The inadequacy of (international) law – or of (international) law 
traditionally understood – to meet contemporary challenges is also a 
kind of Arendtian theme. I understand some of your past remarks as 
suggesting that the inadequacy of law you refer to is in part a version 
of the difficulties attendant to translating or transcribing the laws of 
nature into positive law – difficulties attendant to aligning fusis and 
nomos (Kelley 1990), or should we say, fusis and tekne? It’s as if you’ve 
come to the conclusion that positive law traditionally understood cannot 
translate the laws of nature, in other words, the laws of the earth. If 
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human law is to align itself with the laws of nature, if a social contract 
is to be ‘naturalised’ or transformed into or supplemented by a ‘natural 
contract’ (Serres 1995), you seem to suggest that we need to turn to a 
different kind of legal or social normativity. In order to make possible 
this alignment, I see you turn in the direction of, among other things, 
‘nudging,’ and behavioural economics. 
One of the interesting things about your project, to put it too 
simplistically and reductively, is its use of ‘a’ technology – the cell 
phone – to answer a challenge unleashed by technology or, perhaps 
to be more precise, ‘technique’ (Heidegger 1977: 3)…. I wonder about 
how the very thing you are turning to – the cell phone – could itself 
instantiate a great failure of human beings with regard to the earth. 
We’ve already spoken about how the cell phone is one of the least 
circular products out there, given its use of rare earth metals. We can 
also add to this the kind of critiques of the cell phone that confront 
it as an ‘absolute device’ (Ferraris 2014a: 59) itself invested in, so to 
speak, the transformations of beings, including human beings, into 
‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger 1977: 18). Both the Anthropocene and 
the cell phone seem to point to a kind of ‘total mobilisation’ that may 
‘reveal human nature to itself ’ (Ferraris 2014b: 205). Your project raises 
the question of how they do so or could do so together.
R: Certainly, one can ask why we would do the crazy thing of 
relying upon the very mechanisms that disconnect us from the material 
conditions of our lives in order to produce some sort of collective action 
in response to these changes in material conditions. I’ll share my state 
of mind and maybe I’m now on a path dependency of my own in giving 
this kind of answer. I think that what is ‘de-materialising’ us is what 
we have to pay attention to if we are to realign collective behaviour. 
If we could learn how to ‘nudge’ – to use the behavioural economics 
term – the  representations of ourselves, those virtual creations in this 
world of social media, would we be able, in a sense, to amplify the shift 
in behaviour that is needed in the material world? To be more specific, 
if people are now actually oriented towards what their choices mean 
for Facebook and Instagram and Twitter identities and want to be 
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able to represent themselves successfully on such networks, can they 
be mobilised to improve social choices? If enough of them really care 
to be seen as ‘virtuous’ as regards collective impacts, can that in turn 
help to amplify their willingness to change settled habits involving 
patterns of consumption?
M: It sounds like one of the things we’ve been doing in our 
conversation is dancing around a distinction such as the one between 
reality and ‘social reality’ (Ferraris 2014a: 3). At first glance, the 
Anthropocene – which we have not quite spoken about directly so 
far – is not ‘social reality’ but ‘material reality’. How does it become 
social reality? How does the normativity, the laws of nature, of the 
earth, that govern the Anthropocene become part of, tractable in, the 
laws of Facebook or social networks? It seems like part of what you are 
doing, what you are interested in, which I don’t necessarily see in the 
phenomenological or media-technological takes on the cell phone, is 
not just that the cell phone transforms or reveals normativity …. Yes, 
that is all nice and good. But that is not the whole of our predicament. 
We need to translate ‘the natural’ into ‘the social’. The traces or archives 
that interest us are not just those tied to the cell phone but the traces 
or the archives of the earth, on the earth …. 
R: That is a profound observation. The term ‘Anthropocene’ has 
to do with traces on the earth. It’s a hypothesis that geologists are 
apparently in the midst of debating, although they are in no great rush 
to resolve the matter because they are operating in geological time! The 
notion is that our trace upon the earth is such that we can characterise 
the sedimentary deposit of Anthropos as sufficient to characterise a new 
geological era. Examples of the Anthropocene from a geologist’s point 
of view would be the bizarre rock forms that are now incorporating 
plastic or the fact that you can take soil samples anywhere on the planet 
now and find some traces of human activity. So, in fact, you are right, 
there is significant evidence of the ubiquitous material presence of 
human activity in the geological record. From another point of view 
though, as you put it, there is a need to take this material reality and 
turn it into a social reality. The problem could be turned upside down. 
From the vantage point of the geological record, the human trace is 
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an infinitesimal sort of surface trace and as quickly as it arises could 
be overwhelmed by what would replace it. Books have been written 
that project forward what the geological record will look like once 
we disappear, so as to predict what would quickly be re-absorbed 
and what would not (Weisman 2007). There’s actually not that much 
that would be left for very long. Why am I saying that? The current 
material reality is only of significance as a representation back to us 
of a certain social outcome, namely ‘the world without us’, to borrow 
Weisman’s title. The Anthropocene is only a relevant phenomenon 
to the extent that we care about whether a continued human trace is 
something to be sought. If that were not of significance, we would just 
observe a 2oC temperature increase ushering in runaway climate change 
corresponding to a mass extinction. We would also observe that this 
extinction would ultimately include the disappearance of a particular 
species that was responsible for the phenomenon. Whatever would then 
substitute for that particular bio-geo-climatic condition would simply 
arise. As we departed from it, the geological record would reveal itself 
as utterly immune to any normative orientation as regards us; unless 
the removal of our continuing trace upon the geological record is our 
moral recompense! 
M: The very name of your app brings together, combines, both the 
archiving, inscribing of or on the earth and the connectivity actualised 
and symbolised by the cell phone. Can you tell us more about why your 
app is called ‘Myko’?
R: Well, it’s the Greek root for the family of organisms of the fungi 
kingdom, including yeasts, mushrooms and lichen. There were two 
reasons we chose that name. The first was that in nature, these plants 
are actually strong bio indicators. They register environmental impacts 
with exquisite sensitivity. Thus, if you go to the Île Sainte-Hélène and 
Île Notre-Dame in Montreal before and after the Grand Prix, one of 
the ways of telling that it took place is to look at the lichen because 
they degrade very quickly in response to the changing air conditions. 
So, these organisms can respond more acutely than technical 
instruments to changing environmental impacts. But the other reason 
97
Is Technology for the Anthropocene an Impossibility? 
A Conversation about the Myko Project
for the name is something called the mycorrhizal network, formed of 
fungal filaments existing in symbiosis with the roots of plants. This is 
what some people call, using totally upside down logic, ‘the internet 
of trees.’ You have probably seen that if you dig up the roots of trees 
that they have a kind of white fibrous material, the mycorrhizae. A 
representation of this phenomenon is in the film Avatar, strangely 
enough, since we’re talking about avatars in virtual reality. The entire 
planet Pandora seems to be connected to the Tree of Souls. That was 
a mythical extension of the mycorrhizal network.  
M: So, you don’t really have the word ‘Anthropocene’ in the name of 
the app … but you have the bio-indication possibility of these organisms 
and their strong connectivity.
R: We wanted to underscore the notion of signaling and connectivity 
in the Anthropocene. In a forest, what the mycorrhizal network does is 
allow a parent tree to send nutrients to a sapling. So, it involves a mode 
of communication among these plants. We wanted to convey the idea 
that we were learning to communicate organically about the impacts 
that we’re having on the planet. It was actually the student researchers 
who chose the name. One of our researchers proposed it, the students 
conducted a focus group exercise and this was the proposed name that 
had the most appeal. 
M: As I understand it, your app makes use of different kinds of 
logic that lead us to think of normativity in different ways. Drawing 
on our previous conversations, I think I can name several. One logic 
is a logic of real-time signaling (and perhaps gathering) of information 
made possible by the cell phone and connectivity. This enables a kind 
of collective and individual representation of a sustainability footprint. 
This awareness of human beings, of their footprint, however, may not 
be sufficient to ‘move’ human beings to action.  A second logic, then, 
is that of ‘nudging,’ of finding ways to move people that do not involve 
explicit command or direction, that perhaps do not speak to ‘practical 
reason’ or to the ‘will’ as ‘rules’ do. A third logic is tied to social media, 
what I’ve called, perhaps inappropriately, a thumodic logic.3 This is a 
logic of competition, of comparing oneself with others, of the desire 
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for ‘recognition.’ A fourth logic is tied to the video game and involves 
the building of a ‘world’ with different layers or ‘levels’ to be traversed 
or uncovered. ... Perhaps you can tell us about the different versions 
of Myko and the way in which each of these harnesses - or not - the 
different logics or normativities? 
R: The first version was just set up to show you a score for a given 
action. It operated like a ‘quantified self ’ tool that people use and 
follow, for example to know how many steps they’ve taken, or how 
many calories they’ve eaten or what heartbeat they are registering. It 
would just follow your behaviours, for example with respect to modes 
of transportation, and you entered them and you got a score, based on 
the life cycle analysis of the impacts of the behaviour, just by swiping 
the action that you’d taken from a list you set up. We had a leader board 
and so you could see where you ranked in comparison with others. It 
was a very real metrification of the score.
M: So … users entered their own data.  And there was a kind of 
competition or thumodic element, of seeing and being seen, of seeking 
distinction.
R: Yes. We decided in the second version - which is in hibernation 
- to move away from that sort of purely metrified approach and make it 
more of a visual representation where you were taking care of yourself 
and taking care of your planet. We did it in a very, very simple way. 
We were playing on the idea of the old Tamagotchi digital pets. 
Children were really into them in the 1990s and they had to feed their 
virtual animals and pay attention to them for their animals to grow 
or indeed their digital pets could die. In our version of this idea, as 
people improved on their impacts in different domains - food, waste, 
energy and so on - trees would grow in their world corresponding to 
improving impacts; their world would become more lush with more 
sustainable behaviour. If you did something positive so many times, it 
would qualify you for a harder positive action ... and the branches of 
the trees would open up. As regards food, for example, if you gave up 
meat once a week, that would grow a branch on the food tree with a 
new leaf on it. You could open up other possibilities and eventually you 
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could become vegan. So, the platform was meant to incline you towards 
improving your impacts and growing your trees. And, to adopt a new 
behaviour involved learning something about the impacts of foregone 
behaviour and answering questions on quizzes.
M: So, the first version involved a kind of social media, thumodic 
logic and the second version led to some gamification, not in the sense 
of more competition or quest for recognition but in the sense of world-
building, of virtual worlds? And the data was still gathered in the same 
way between the two versions?  Can you tell me more about the move 
from the first to the second, about how you discovered ‘gamification’?
R: We wanted to see what worked, and it was possible that different 
kinds of choice architectures, to use the behavioural economics term, 
would nudge differently. The reason the second one was called gamified 
was actually fairly technical. We built it with someone who had worked 
at Ubisoft and he looked at what we had in the first version and said, 
‘Oh, you’ve got individual scores and I know about game architecture, 
which requires that you move from level to level and that you have the 
ability to unlock new choices and outcomes.’ We didn’t want it to be 
a game like a video game, but we did want people to have the feeling 
that they were moving in a positive direction and were engaged by the 
experience. We wanted to go beyond the passive experience of the first 
version in which you would make your own checklist of things you 
wanted to do, say walk to work three times this week, and then when 
you did them you’d swipe right you would get points each time you 
fulfilled your own targets.
M: So, if I get it right, the first one is a multi-use tool. You can use 
it to set a range of different sustainability goals. The second one gives 
you more like an online persona with a narrative arc with a character 
who moves through a world: that’s the gamification.
R: We didn’t go far with the persona idea. However, we thought 
that we had made the first version of the Myko world and we imagined 
that it could become more and more like what you describe, depending 
upon how it appealed to people. 
M: That’s where perhaps there are different kinds of ‘addictive 
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possibilities’ to turn people onto environmentalism or what have you. 
R: Yes, but we built it in a very sober stripped down way. We didn’t 
want it to feel cartoonish to people. Thus, for example the branches 
and leaves of the tree were very suggestive and abstract rather than a 
formal depiction of a tree. 
M: I see. So, we’ve talked a little bit about what I’ve called a 
thumodic logic as well as a little about gamification. Both of these 
involve moving people in specific ways. We have not really spoken 
about ‘nudging,’ however. Was there nudging in the app itself?
R: Well there weren’t formal nudges or incentives built-in like 
having free tickets for public transit, but we planned to have trees 
planted for people who completed trees in the app and explored that 
in some detail. I observe that a system like this is widely used in China 
today. But our form of nudging was mainly the score itself and the desire 
to open up new branches. We sought to help people to get to the point 
that they would form new habits. However, we always sought to engage 
them in making those choices for themselves. The architecture of the 
app was designed to make it possible to incorporate further nudges 
and incentives that would help users to improve their own footprint. 
M: And you have a third version?
R: Yes, we had 1.0, the metric tool, and 2.0, the virtual world, and 
now we are working on 3.0. The main problem we discovered with the 
second version was that people got bored with it eventually. At first 
it had a certain appeal, but then it wore off. Our initial reaction was 
that we had not made it addictive enough. But for some of the reasons 
you’ve invoked, I was not very attracted to that way of thinking. So, 
in a sense we went back to the original experiment and we said to 
ourselves that the problem is that we still hadn’t succeeded in making 
this immediate or automatic. Each of the first two versions required 
people themselves to use the tool to enter what they had done so as to 
be able to get information back for themselves.
M: It seems to me that requiring users to enter their own data keeps 
the app at a certain distance from the users while still granting them 
a certain level of control, for example over which goals they wish to 
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achieve. This, one might say, makes the app more of a tool and a much 
less effective ‘prosthetic’ ... thus limiting the possibilities of what you 
have called ‘real-time’ law or normativity.  On the other hand, if users 
do not need to enter their data themselves, the app might be closer to 
being a full-fledged prosthetic or ‘conscience’ app, providing a more 
immediate translation of the laws of the earth into human normativity. 
Of course, this kind of ‘conscience prosthetic’ and the way data entry 
might work raise all kinds of dystopian scenarios.
R: Yes. There’s a huge dystopian potential to this. It’s not just 
hypothetical anymore. It’s manifest in the way China is trying to deploy 
exactly these kinds of ideas. China has a social score technology it is 
unfolding all across the country. China has sufficient facial recognition 
technology with capacity to deduct points from people who jaywalk. The 
idea is you’re assigned a certain number of points and you can improve 
your score or diminish it depending on the choices you make. A lot of 
it seems to be targeted to some way of measuring loyalty. 
M: But you still see something positive in this despite the dystopian 
potential?
R: Yes. You could say such a technology is precisely about rendering 
citizenship visible to people. If privacy can be protected, should I not 
hold myself to account for my citizenship failures? (I am thinking a 
little of Judith Butler’s (2007) Giving an Account of Oneself ). When I 
jaywalk, when I fail to pick up litter … whatever I do in falling short 
of some citizenship ideal should be made visible to me as much as 
my bank account is or can be. … Ideally, every kind of ‘ justice claim’ 
should somehow be registered and made visible. At least, that’s the idea. 
And, as soon as we make something visible to ourselves, we transform 
it into a social signal.
M: Does this not involve translating a citizen persona into a 
consumer one, so to speak?
R: You had said, in a previous conversation, that there might be 
some virtue to dealing with a kind of bounded rationality problem – 
people cannot absorb all the signals nature might send so perhaps we 
need a way of assembling into a unity what could then be disaggregated 
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if people want to look at it. The price signal already does that, perhaps 
in a way we don’t like. What if all the externalities we are generating, 
all of our collective impact, were to be captured in some signal? Moving 
beyond the price signal is tied to attempts to measure sustainability 
and collective well-being – using a ‘dashboard’ of indicators – in a way 
that goes beyond GDP (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009).
M: But can we separate visibility to oneself and visibility to others, 
and if so how? What kind of ‘sight’ might be required or engendered 
by this demand for visibility? Think of James C Scott’s (1999) Seeing 
Like a State and his exposition of failures to improve the human 
condition tied to this kind of sight. ... Think too, for example, of the 
institutionalisation and supervision of conscience in the history of the 
Church (Saada and Antaki 2018). Does the app not seek to generate 
but also institutionalise a kind of conscience? Does the social score not 
reflect a kind of calculable contribution to a collective salvation? Is it 
possible to ‘generate’ a conscience without institutionalising it? How 
so? What is the relation between the app as tied to a care of the self 
(Foucault 1997) and the app as signaling subservience, subordination, a 
willingness to be governed this way or to this extent? (Foucault 1990).
R: You have put some hard questions on the table. The effort to 
track our impacts has obvious Foucauldian implications. It invokes not 
only the image of the Panopticon but also brings to mind contemporary 
Omniopticons, as I’ve put it elsewhere – that is, all of us observing all 
of us. The other thing you’ve placed on the table – and perhaps tied 
to thinking of the app as a form of  ‘conscience’ – is the relation of 
fusis and tekne. Might we embroil ourselves in a terrible contradiction 
in imagining that further investment in technology will allow us to 
re-align with fusis? With respect to the first issue, I am not terribly 
satisfied with my response at this juncture and am somewhat overtaken 
by events. I had imagined building privacy into the collection of data, 
dispersing it among all users on the blockchain, and making its third-
party use governed by those who provide it. I thought such governance 
structures would legitimate this kind of collection of data. But the 
challenge is enormous.
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We also need to mention the ‘Hawthorne effect’, a kind of flipside 
of the Panopticon, exactly what Bentham imagined would shift the 
behaviour of prisoners. The very fact of being observed changes the 
way one behaves. We have built a notional ‘eye in the sky.’ An ‘eye in 
the sky’ has been imagined for eons in relation to ‘virtue’ as we seek 
to be virtuous in the name of God. We have always had the idea that 
we will have to render our accounts to the one who sees everything 
that has happened.
I am also thinking of the famous ‘Nosedive’ episode of the series 
Black Mirror that everybody has been disturbed by, and that has come 
up in newspaper treatments of the Chinese social score example. In 
this episode, everybody is scoring everybody else and a woman watches 
her score diminish to the point of being driven insane. The entire 
world is divided into those who’ve opted out, and are totally socially 
marginalised, and those who can literally cash in on this social capital. 
People will respond to being put on display in this fashion. We have 
here the dystopian dimensions of a thumodic economy. … How can we 
produce a context in which the thumodic aspects of social interaction 
do not generate widely dystopian effects?
M: The example of China brings us in one direction and raises 
the dystopian potential of the project. However, the example may not 
enable us to perfectly name misgivings about the project or articulate 
well its critiques. For one thing, it does not capture the problem of 
technique as one not necessarily tied to specific political arrangements. 
In our conversations, we’ve identified two interesting ways to frame 
the problems tied to the kinds of logics which this app harnesses 
when these logics are pushed to their its limits. One is the idea that 
humanity would rely on one extremely significant ‘externality’ – the 
externalisation of intelligence, in the words of Michel Serres (2015: 
25), in order to solve a problem of externalities, to use the economic 
term. ... Another is the question of the possibility or danger of relying 
on the ‘virtual’ in order to engender ‘virtue.’ Indeed, we discovered – 
to our delight – that ‘virtual’ and ‘virtue’ have the same root ... and 
that led us to wonder about their phenomenological (dis)connections!
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R: If I recall, the question of the externalisation of intelligence came 
up in two ways. One was the question of how, specifically, to name 
our current epoch or predicament. The other was about thinking more 
clearly, naming better, what is going on with ‘artificial intelligence’.
M: Yes, we had been thinking about how to name our epoch or 
predicament – late capitalism, neoliberalism, technique for example – 
and about whether or how such things as a thumodic economy fit into 
that. … What is ‘new’ exactly?
R: We can go back over time and discover various ways in which 
every generation imagined itself to be at some epochal moment. How 
is it we have the thumos to think of ourselves, and the Anthropocene 
as being at some epochal moment?
M: It came earlier, no? … nuclear weapons, negative solidarity. 
We are bound together by virtue of our ability to destroy everything. 
R: There are three moments, I would say, maybe others: the 
Holocaust, nuclear annihilation, and the prospect of the end of life. 
This is all, I think, connected together. I am also thinking of a bit of 
Žižek (2011) and also Northrop Frye (2006) – the notion that the 
biblical narrative was already one that placed us in relation to some 
end, some end time. This feature of the religious imagination continues 
to imbue us.
M: I think too of Robert Meister’s (2006: ix-x) analysis of different 
experiences of time and of end times, for example the ‘prophetic’ where 
the time to change is now as opposed to the ‘messianic’ where there is 
more time to be had between a first and a second coming. ...  The logic 
of the messianic, of buying more time, might be one of continuing to 
generate externalities … because there will be time to fold back in 
today’s externalities.
If the ‘end’ to be avoided is a ‘world without us,’ it might be a perfect 
time for artificial intelligence to happen: an uncanny juxtaposition. 
The Anthropocene leads us to imagine a world without us and where 
the cell phone is tied to ‘artificial intelligence,’ to the externalisation 
of our intelligence. … I was reading about the development of a device 
that can ‘hear’ the words we say ‘silently.’ ‘It’s like having Siri listen to 
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your internal commands’ reads the sub-title of a Popular Science article 
(April 6 2018).
R: But Siri is designed not to answer certain kinds of questions 
and to not form certain kinds of connections. Indeed, I read that the 
designers of Siri, which was bought out by Apple, had originally built 
certain functionalities into Siri that Apple later cut off because they 
thought people would find it too disturbing if Siri gave answers to 
certain kinds of questions. I went to a play last year at the Théatre 
d’Aujourd’hui which was entitled ‘Siri’. The actress talked to Siri the 
whole time on stage. She actually found ways to get Siri to engage, to 
learn about Siri so she could start to gain certain indirect answers to 
questions. At the end, she asked Siri to tell her everything Siri knew 
about her. The play produced the bizarre sensation the playwright was 
seeking: that we started to care about Siri. 
I described the perhaps somewhat redemptive view that our 
technology had given us the capacity to see our collective action … 
and orient ourselves in relation to outcomes we were seeing coming at 
us in real time or in close to real time. But you could have a different 
view. Like the film Stalker, Tarkovsky’s masterpiece, where in fact 
we introduce ourselves into a world that is shedding itself of us. The 
externalisation of our intelligence is all that will be left once we produce 
the world without us … or the transition we will have created is to 
a kind of intelligence that could maintain itself in our absence. And 
that’s the kind of thing that Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Bill Gates 
and others who signed what is in essence a manifesto against artificial 
intelligence were foreseeing. So it’s not just the pure science fiction 
ravings about the Terminator. A pretty deep critique of what I am up 
to is that I am unwittingly or semi-wittingly engaged with others in 
producing the grounds of the possibility of the world without us.
M: Yes. This goes back to the earlier question of how the 
Anthropocene reveals us to ourselves, to borrow the words of Ferraris 
regarding the cell phone. I was thinking about whether and how both 
the Anthropocene and the cell phone are manifestations of technique, 
of the transformation of all beings into ‘standing reserve.’ This has 
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something to do with the cell phone as more a general instrument than 
a tool designed for one purpose, with the cell phone as an ‘absolute 
device.’ With technique, even ethical comportment – including those 
who are supposed to comport themselves ethically – becomes energy 
to be deployed, mapped, harnessed.
R: Michel Serres is the one who I felt helped me to understand 
the significance of this universal technology. I do detect a kind of 
Biblical narrative about how knowledge interacts with the destruction 
of the garden of Eden. This is how or why, over the course of our 
conversations, I shifted from ‘universal dispositif ’ or ‘absolute device’ 
to ‘externalisation of all knowledge’ in my framing of things. That is 
what I’ve drawn from Serres, that we are carrying with us always at all 
moments every possible understanding of all things and the way we 
interact with ourselves. So, the cell phone is a further externalisation 
of knowing that pursues what we already accomplished with speech 
and writing and publication before. 
We can think of speech as already making available to you and to 
me something that I seek to articulate or express about what I know. A 
logos moment. And then we can think of writing, for instance by way 
of Plato’s Phaedrus, as producing distance from the direct expression 
of ideas in speech. And of course, the printing press as described in 
McLuhan’s Gutenberg Galaxy (2011) further extends the distance 
from expression and enhances the autonomy of the text. What Serres 
is saying about the smart phone is that it actually goes a step further 
in placing my intelligence outside of myself. It could in fact produce a 
kind of autonomy to intelligence. We speak of ‘artificial intelligence’ 
as if it is something like ourselves in tekne. That is the way we’ve 
imagined it: something human-like placed into a dispositif which then 
begins to pursue objectives of its own. This kind of fantasy is captured 
in films likes Ex Machina or Her. But I think that overly personifies 
or anthropomorphises the artificial intelligence we are in the midst of 
creating. Machine learning algorithms, it seems to me, come closer to 
being like the artificial intelligence already imagined by Adam Smith 
(1761, 1776) when he wrote of an invisible hand that was able to orient 
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human beings collectively toward rational outcomes exceeding their 
own individual intelligence. There is a sense in which it is our collective 
intelligence that is augmented through the machine learning algorithms 
we are beginning to deploy. After all, these algorithms are ‘trained’ 
by us to pursue outcomes that we seek. There is a light film starring 
Johnny Depp, Transcendence, in which he – his intelligence – in essence 
gets uploaded into some form of digital universe. It has produced its 
own capacity to interact with all things. That’s closer to the artificial 
intelligence we are creating now at the moment where everything 
derived from our own intelligence is extended into tekne and producing 
a form of autonomy from us. The driverless car exhibits this property.
You’ve raised the question of what it means to align the 
externalisation of our intelligence with the laws of the earth. I felt 
naively that there was something salutary and propitious to the fact 
that this universal dispositif emerged at the same moment that we could 
render visible everything that we could destroy. It put us back in the 
Garden of Eden so to speak. Now that you’ve eaten from this tree of 
knowledge or intelligence, what will you do with what you have taken? 
M: And what happens to the ‘virtue’ you are interested in fostering 
with the externalisation of our intelligence? Or to modify the question 
and transform it into a different one: (how) can the virtual teach virtue?
R: What do we mean by the ‘virtual’ anyhow?
M: Is the virtual something that is not actualised but actualisable: 
is it a fitness or in that sense a virtue, basically?
R: The one transition in the etymology that I found interesting is 
to be ‘virtually broke,’ which suggests that you are all but broke but 
not quite broke. 
M: This is like Aristotle discussing the Megarian School position 
in the Metaphysics where he introduces the idea of a potentiality. For 
the Megarians, when a cat is jumping, say, it can jump, but when it is 
not it cannot. However, when the cat is about to pounce, that would 
be the virtual. It is virtually jumping because it has that capacity, but 
it is not yet actualising it. 
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R: Right, when it’s crouching and is about to pounce it has 
virtually pounced. The total concentration of potentiality just before its 
actualisation, as if you were winding a spring, and you know that when 
it releases it will uncoil. It has become taut and virtually sprung and 
that potentiality can be stored. So how would that idea of the stored, 
accentuated, unrealised potentiality as ‘virtual’ relate to virtual reality?
M: In effect, how did the computer scientists take over this world?
R: I see a step taken first as regards the use of memory in the 
computer. When it uses real memory, the computer’s operating system 
stores data in a physical address. When it uses virtual memory, it puts 
it in a virtual address on the hard drive, from which it can be assigned 
to real memory. Virtual memory is both potentially real memory and 
a way of emulating real memory on another device. 
M: As regards a virtual reality, what is interesting there is the 
presence of the term ‘reality’ as well. The phrase ‘virtual reality’ seems to 
be an oxymoron. However, I believe the connection is that virtual reality 
has everything but this tiny little slice of the real. But as we augment 
virtual reality, our perception of it and the sensations it can produce 
in us come closer and closer to resembling the so-called real world.
R: That’s really interesting. What this would mean is that the 
computerised, digital world has succeeded in stocking up potential. 
What it has sliced off is the layer of actualisation. It allows us to inhabit 
potential in its entirety. When you think of it in that way it’s true that 
these virtual worlds have the bizarre quality to them that you can jump 
anywhere or you can come back to life; there’s never the reckoning of 
actualisation. Everything still remains possible. So, if you thought of it 
as pure potentiality or pure possibility, that would be a virtual reality. 
M: I was wondering to what degree the idea of potentiality had been 
lost. Do you keep the idea of potentiality if the virtual emulates the real?
R: Well there is another theme embedded here that we haven’t 
touched upon so much. We called it the thumodic, the sense that one 
would be exposed to public censure or shame, but there is also the sense 
of play. Virtual reality seems to connect to the ludic. I have re-read 
Huizinga’s (1971) Homo Ludens. I have also been quite influenced by 
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Brian Massumi’s (2014) What Animals Teach Us about Politics. Massumi 
focuses a great deal upon play. His figure is that of the animals that 
play-flight. They nip but they don’t bite. The nip is a kind of potential 
biting and they’re acting out all of the possibility of violence, but they 
are doing that playfully, without actualisation.
M: But we can do that too, without virtual reality.
R: Yes, but although Massumi does not write about this, there is 
something about virtual reality that is the reality of play or a reality 
that would always have the feature of play to it because it would never 
translate itself, to be Heideggerian for a moment, into a being-unto-
death. Your avatar is something that in principle never perishes. You 
can lose at a game but you just start over.
M: But I think I want to resist that … because the nip has a 
proximity to the bite that the so-called virtual doesn’t have. If two 
kids are play-fighting, they could punch a bit harder and are pulling 
punches. There is always a sense of pulling back and also of attunement, 
of attunement one to the other. In the play in virtual reality, there is 
no necessary sense of pulling back. It’s as if one can unleash violence, 
potentially kill thousands of people. There is no nipping there. What 
I’m curious about is what fantasies or unconscious drives the virtual 
allows people to explore in a way that is different from the nipping 
form of play?
R: What you are saying is really well taken. There is a proximity 
between the nip and what it could become. The potentiality is standing 
in relation to an actualisation. If you were to sever the potentiality from 
the actualisation, and it were always only a nip, perhaps you could 
construct a world entirely of that sort. Call it Westworld, where basically 
even if you unleashed yourself fully that would never translate itself 
into all of the slaughter that your senses were experiencing. That may 
be one of the problems with virtual reality and where its relationship to 
virtue starts to break down. Is there something about virtue that gave 
to the name virtual precisely something that stood in relation to the 
actual in the sense of exercising manhood or displaying the behaviour 
or capacity that in its potential prepared for the actual? I just learned of 
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the training in virtue of the Maasai warriors whose potential to defend 
the community and its herd of animals is only celebrated once they 
have killed a lion. In this sense, for there to be virtue in the virtual, it 
trades upon its eventual actualisation. Now, however, in virtual reality, 
virtue has become so utterly detached from its actualization that there 
is a kind of gap or breach introduced into the display of virtue. This 
may be a feature of contemporary discourse insofar as people engaging 
on social media sense themselves to be in a virtual space rather than 
a public forum or agora of some kind, where the actual implications 
of anger, fear and humiliation are directly lived out. I think there is 
something about the complete storage of potentiality unrelated to 
actualisation that is very significant for our capacity to be virtuous. 
There may also be contexts in which living with the actualisation of the 
virtual accentuates rather than numbs our disorientation. Apparently 
the American pilots of drones face equal or perhaps even greater post-
traumatic stress disorder engaging in what can feel like virtual combat 
as they confront the actualisation of the attacks they have unleashed 
on civilians (Telegraph 2015). 
M: A few things come to mind in what you are saying. One 
concerns the virtual as a ‘replacement for’ the metaphysical or other 
world. Perhaps we are living in end times and thus there is a looming 
relationship to the afterlife. Does the virtual produce anything 
significant in relationship to that situation? Is it where I seek salvation? 
This world is not good enough for me; I am miserable or bored, so I 
go into the virtual where there is redemption and salvation and I can 
find my better self. So that is one potentiality. 
R: Well I am not a gamer but so often it seems to be the opposite: 
let’s plunge further into the dystopian, because that way we can 
accustom and inure ourselves to that experience without actually 
having it.
M: Well that could also be ressentiment, like the weak find the 
pleasure of being the strong in that place where you don’t have to face 
death for real. I don’t know exactly how Massumi treats this, but the 
thing about nipping is that it is play fighting with another real animal. 
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There is a social dimension there. Do I need there to be other human 
beings playing in the virtual world? Does that matter or not? All kinds 
of bots and avatars populate the virtual world. Does it matter whether 
there are real others and whether the virtual world is shared? We are 
here exploring how ‘being-with’ – something completely bound up with 
how we usually think of ‘virtue’ – is or can be declined.
R: Well, the film Ready Player One engages with all of this because 
it sets up the reversal of the relationship between the virtual and the 
real. It draws on the premise that after a dystopian collapse of the world 
into slum conditions, the most significant economic activity is play in 
a virtual world. The largest company has become one that makes the 
games for this world. Everyone is connected virtually to these games 
and plays almost continuously. When people enter the world they can 
play in, what’s at stake is the commercial control over the actual entities 
that sell them the virtual world. You can imagine how the film might 
structure this: a kind of back and forth between the virtual and the real, 
between entering into the game and leaving it to try to control it and 
then re-entering it to do the same. There’s a kind of seamless movement 
back and forth. At one point, though, the people who are playing and 
have met only as avatars meet in the real world and turn out to be very 
different from their personae. Thus, for example, a great warrior almost 
inevitably turns out to be an eleven-year-old. What drives the drama 
of it is that it is very difficult for people to tell whether they are in the 
material or virtual world and in the end the two become indissociable. 
M: What is the relationship between what you are doing with 
your app and this virtual world? I suppose you were believing – or 
hoping to discover – that there can be a so-called healthy relationship 
between the virtual and the real. Perhaps my avatar can teach me to 
re-connect with the world. Perhaps there is a promise in virtuality 
just like Lynn Hunt (2008) has argued that epistolary novels taught 
people about human rights and empathy. When there is a new medium 
or technology, whether it be the epistolary novel or something else, it 
becomes a pedagogical tool. Is the question one of its deployment and 
of its tendency towards worldliness or worldlessness? That seems to 
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be the connection. Your task or challenge would be: ‘how do I get the 
app to align well so that it and the score relate you back to reality?’ It’s 
not a score about how many people I’ve killed or how many treasures 
I’ve collected. It’s meant to be a total reflection of my situatedness in 
the world, so it should throw me back into the world. It’s a virtual that 
cannot absorb the real but rather can become absorbed by the real. Is 
that possible and is it in the very nature of virtuality to hold out such 
a promise?
R: Yes, that’s exactly where the connection is. We haven’t touched 
upon this so far but to the extent that it was gamified, it was designed 
to get people involved and engaged with it.
M: If you are still Richard on the app, is it gamified? Facebook is 
not gamified, is it? You’re still who you are. There’s no avatar, is there? 
If you have a fake name and your appearance is dissembled, that seems 
like a different thing than if it's Facebook and you have real pictures 
and you are sharing your life. Or is it identical? What is the difference?
R: It’s a little bit of a tangent but I think that Facebook still gives 
people the occasion to curate themselves and so what they present 
about themselves and how they seek to appear is different perhaps from 
who they are and more about how they could be or want to appear. It 
works in both directions, though, because circumstances arise in which 
people are confronted in their real workplaces with the representations 
of themselves that they are making online. So, they get themselves in 
trouble for trying to appear to be exotic creatures on Facebook, which 
then seems to be out of line with the way they are trying to appear in 
the workplace.  
M: This makes me think of Goffman’s (1959) presentation of self 
in everyday life and its adaption into an online or networked world. 
It also makes me wonder about how ‘personality’ or ‘legal personality’ 
might need to be re-thought. ...
R: Where the project was trying to exploit this, and I use the term 
advisedly, was how we thought that there could be a kind of virtuous 
back and forth between the virtual and real worlds. It is odd now to 
confront the etymology of ‘world’; I hadn’t seen that it has already an 
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anthropocentric quality to it, coming from the Old English wer which 
is a Germanised version of vir and so it already has that sense of ‘man’ 
in it. The simple idea for our project was that we wanted everyone 
to have their own world, and to be able to see how their behaviour 
changed their world.
M: And so … ‘world’ brings us back to ‘virtue’ as well! 
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